Th e object of scientifi c study of medicine is the physical body. As Ivan Varga points out, modernity has meant 'materialising' as well as 'scientifi cising' the body, which is studied as subject to the laws of nature. 'Advances in biochemistry, genetics . . . dietetics, etc., together with their oft en watered down popularisation, spread the image of the scientifi cally determinable natural body. Th e healthy body-in itself not a bad thing-is more and more associated with scientifi c advances'. Yet in medicine, such treatment of the body may limit our perspective and communication about who or what is being treated. We need to ask ourselves whether this treatment concerns only the disease, or the human being. To treat the human being is to recognise they way in which their world view inscribes the body with value, and makes illness and health meaningful.
Th e secular state and debates in medical ethics
Contemporary political philosophy presents the ideal of a state that is neutral in respect to religion, and the diff ering value systems accepted by its citizens. In medicine and the health care system, however, we fi nd that the state cannot be neutral. It must have a view (or an implied view) on diff erent conceptions of life and death, for instance, to manage the legislation of organ donation, euthanasia, abortion, and stem-cell research. In all of these issues, religious perspectives on moral issues are seen in contrast to science. 'Science deals with facts, not values, and medicine is a science' .
Hence, we can have an ideal of the medical system being concerned with 'health', as opposed to morality, values or 'religious preferences', and religious preferences or values understood as personal choices relating to autonomy. It is not that there should be no limits to what medical research or what medical procedures should be undertaken based on moral concerns, but our policy approach to this should respect the 'facts', as these are considered 'value neutral' laws of nature. It appears there is little within the framework that makes distinctions between facts and values to accommodate religious perspectives. Th ese are seen as empirically untrue, and based on authoritarian dogma, or sentiment. Not every perspective can be, or should be, permitted to be expressed. Th e law must limit our choices to those that are morally acceptable, specifi cally in relation to the harm we may do others. But, what is morally acceptable depends upon constructions of the body and the world that are contested.
Th e way in which we frame our moral and political discussion, therefore, is limited both to a particular conception of the body, and a particular approach to religion. Th e approach to the body is that of the individual, limited organism, and our approach to religious values is an example of the privatisation of religious belief to a preference. Th e objective of this book is to broaden these horizons. Th is book addresses this issue through presenting diff erent disciplinary and religious perspectives to medicine, religion, and the ethics of illness and well-being. Th ese alternative perspectives enable us to move beyond our preconceptions about the 'value-free basis' of science and medicine, as
